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Abstract 
To examine whether children’s acquisition of perspective-marking language supports 
development in their ability to reason about mental states, we conducted a longitudinal study 
testing whether proficiency with complement clauses around age three explained variance in 
false-belief reasoning six months later. 45 English-speaking 2-and-3-year-olds (23 female, 
Time 1 age range: 33-41 months) from middle-class families in the North-West of England 
took part in the study, which addresses a series of uncertainties in previous studies: We 
avoided the confound of using complement clauses in the false-belief tests, assessed 
complement-clause proficiency with a new comprehensive test designed to capture gradual 
development, and controlled for individual differences in executive functioning that could 
affect both linguistic and sociocognitive performance. Further, we aimed to disentangle the 
influence of two aspects of complement-clause acquisition: proficiency with the perspective-
marking syntactic structure itself and understanding of the specific mental verbs used in this 
syntactic structure. To investigate direction of causality, we also tested whether early false-
belief reasoning predicted later complement-clause proficiency. The results provide strong 
support for the hypothesis that complement-clause acquisition promotes development in 
false-belief reasoning. Proficiency with the general structure of complement-clause 
constructions and understanding of the specific mental verbs “think” and “know” in 3rd-
person complements at Time 1 both contributed uniquely to predicting false-belief 
performance at Time 2. However, false-belief performance at Time 1 also contributed 
uniquely to predicting complement-clause proficiency at Time 2. Together, these results 
indicate a bidirectional relationship between linguistic and sociocognitive development. 
Keywords: complement clauses; false belief; language acquisition; mental verbs; social 
cognition.
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Do complement clauses really support false-belief reasoning? A longitudinal study with 
English-speaking 2- to 3-year-olds 
Being able to see situations from others’ perspectives, being aware of one’s own 
perspective, and being able to reason about mental phenomena such as mistakes and surprise 
are central sociocognitive skills. During the preschool years, children develop abilities to 
represent and to reason flexibly about their own and others’ false beliefs, i.e. beliefs that clash 
with their own current understanding of reality. A body of evidence suggests that linguistic 
experience promotes this development (e.g. Milligan et al., 2007; Schick et al., 2007; 
Tomasello, 2018). While different linguistic skills appear to play a role, and the choice of 
linguistic tool can be affected by crosslinguistic differences in availability and usage patterns 
(e.g., Cheung et al., 2009; Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003), it has been argued that for languages 
like English and German, children’s acquisition of finite complement clauses is especially 
advantageous for facilitating false-belief reasoning (e.g., de Villiers & Pyers, 2002, Lohmann 
& Tomasello, 2003).  
The complement-clause construction is a crosslinguistically widespread type of 
perspective-marking grammar that allows speakers to communicate flexibly and explicitly 
about the relationships between persons and propositions (Boeg Thomsen, 2016; Verhagen, 
2005). In this syntactic construction, a complement clause expressing a proposition, e.g. “It’s 
his ball”, is embedded in another clause, e.g. “He says…” or “I hope…”, that presents a 
specific viewpoint on that proposition, as in “He says [it’s his ball]” or “I hope [it’s his ball]”. 
Complement-clause constructions present the unique trait of suspending speaker 
commitment, providing a means for talking about propositions that the speaker does not 
believe in, as in “He says [it’s his ball], but actually it’s not” (De Villiers & de Villiers, 
2000). De Villiers and de Villiers therefore proposed that complement clauses support 
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children’s false-belief understanding by providing a representational format for reasoning 
about false beliefs.  
In a longitudinal study, de Villiers and Pyers (2002) found empirical support for this 
hypothesis: children’s comprehension of complement clauses such as “She thought [it was a 
toy bird] but it was really a funny hat. What did she think she bought?” at around age 3;8 
(years; months) predicted their ability to pass false-belief tests four months later. Examining 
causality more directly, training studies by Lohmann and Tomasello (2003), Hale and Tager-
Flusberg (2003) and Mo et al. (2014) found improved false-belief performance in German-, 
English- and Mandarin-speaking children trained with complement clauses. In atypical 
development, similar training effects have been reported for Danish-speaking children with 
autism (Boeg Thomsen, 2016) and French-speaking children with autism, Developmental 
Language Disorder (DLD), and (as a control) typical development (Durrleman et al., 2019). 
While not addressing causality, other studies with typically developing children (Brandt et 
al., 2016; Burnel et al., 2020; Durrleman et al., 2016, 2017; Durrleman & Frank, 2015; 
Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2017; Low, 2010; Moore et al., 1990), children with DLD 
(Durrleman et al., 2017; Miller, 2004), deaf children (Schick et al., 2007) and children with 
autism (Durrleman et al., 2016, 2017; Durrleman & Frank, 2015; Lind & Bowler, 2009) have 
found concurrent correlations between complement-clause proficiency and false-belief 
reasoning.  
However, there are critical uncertainties pertaining to previous conclusions about a tight 
relationship between complement-clause proficiency and false-belief reasoning. First, most 
studies use complement clauses in their tests to assess false-belief ability, thus confounding 
the two skills to be compared. Second, it is often unclear what exactly the tests of 
complement-clause mastery are measuring. Third, few studies include measures of executive-
function skills, making it impossible to exclude the possibility that complement 
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comprehension and false-belief ability correlate because success on both tasks depends on the 
same underlying executive-functioning skills.  
The present longitudinal study was designed to test whether we can replicate de Villiers 
and Pyers’ (2002) finding that complement-clause mastery predicts later false-belief 
reasoning when we: 1) use false-belief tests without complement clauses, 2) use a more 
precise measure of complement-clause mastery, and 3) control for a range of executive-
functioning and other background measures. In addition, we address two further issues. First, 
previous research has focused on language and false-belief understanding around 4 years of 
age, but children make important advances in both false-belief reasoning (e.g., Hansen, 2010) 
and complement-clause mastery at younger ages (e.g., Boeg Thomsen, 2016; Brandt et al., 
2010), suggesting that the crucial phase for an interplay may start earlier. Second, it is unclear 
which aspects of complement-clause acquisition might play a critical role in children’s false-
belief reasoning. It could be the syntactic embedding structure (de Villiers & Pyers, 2002) or 
specific mental verbs frequently used in the construction (e.g., Brandt et al., 2016). In 
contrast with previous studies, we use separate tests to examine different degrees of 
abstraction in children’s proficiency with complement clauses in general on the one hand and 
their understanding of specific high-frequency mental verbs (“think” and “know”) in 
complement-clause constructions on the other, to discern whether both play an independent 
role in supporting false-belief reasoning. To further ascertain the specificity of the potential 
influence from mental verbs in complement-clause constructions, we compare them with a 
different type of certainty-marking verbs in simple clauses: epistemic modals (cf. Moore et 
al., 1990). We now explore each of the identified issues with previous research in more detail 
before outlining the current study.  
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Confounds and Underspecifications in Previous Studies 
Linguistic Confounds in False-Belief Tests   
One persistent problem in studies comparing false-belief reasoning and complement-
clause proficiency is that the vast majority use complement clauses in some or all of their 
false-belief tests, thus making complement-clause mastery a prerequisite for passing these 
sociocognitive tests. For example, if we compare questions in the Complement Clauses test 
(1) and the Unexpected Contents false-belief test (2-3) in de Villiers and Pyers (2002), we see 
substantial lexical and structural similarities between them: 
 
(1)  “What did she think she bought?”  (Complement Clauses) 
(2)  “What did you think was in the box?”  (False Belief: Unexpected Contents) 
(3)  “What will Sarah think is in the box?”  (False Belief: Unexpected Contents) 
 
Similar lexical and structural confounds are evident in most other longitudinal, training, 
and correlational studies (e.g., Brandt et al., 2016; Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Lohmann & 
Tomasello, 2003). Thus, when studies report correlations or predictive relations between 
false-belief and complement-clause ability or effects of complement-clause training, it is 
impossible to gauge whether they emerge because complement-clause acquisition has a deep 
conceptual influence on mental-state reasoning or because it allows children to understand 
the false-belief test questions.  
 Promisingly, a number of studies targeting atypical development (deafness, DLD and 
autism) avoided this confound by using false-belief tests without complement clauses and 
still found correlations between complement-clause comprehension and false-belief 
understanding (Durrleman et al., 2016, 2017; Schick et al. 2007) as well as effects of 
complement-clause training (Boeg Thomsen 2016; Durrleman et al., 2019). In the current 
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study, we also avoid the use of complement clauses in the false-belief tests while targeting 
typically developing children and using a longitudinal design.  
Measures of Complement-Clause Mastery 
A second reason for caution when interpreting previous studies on complement clauses 
and false belief is that it is not entirely clear what kind of proficiency the complements tests 
are measuring due to three specific properties of the tests: 1) treating mastery as a binary 
measure (present/absent), 2) the use of a non-prototypical construction, 3) high executive-
functioning demands. 
Treating Mastery as a Binary Measure. The most widely used complements test, 
Memory for Complements, was developed in the late 1990s (de Villiers & Pyers, 1997). The 
conception of complement-clause proficiency underlying this test and later adaptions of it is 
that there is an abstract syntactic complement construction that the child either has or has not 
acquired. Children are presented with 4-12 items of the same structure with one or two 
different recurring complement-taking verbs. If the child performs well with these verbs 
(typically “say”, “think” or “tell”), they are taken to have acquired the construction, whereas 
poor performance is taken to indicate that the child has not yet acquired the syntax of 
complementation. Over the last twenty years, however, corpus studies and production 
experiments have indicated that acquisition of complement syntax proceeds in a gradual 
manner, and that verb frequency plays a central role in this process (Brandt et al., 2010; 
Diessel & Tomasello, 2001; Kidd et al., 2010). The evidence suggests that children slowly 
build up abstract and flexible schemas, starting with lexically specified chunks (e.g., “I 
think…”) and low-level schemas based around verbs that are frequently used in complement-
clause constructions in their input (e.g., [NP] SAY [S], [NP] KNOW [S]). Complements tests 
employing only one or two verbs are unable to capture such gradual development, and it is 
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unclear why performance on only one or two high-frequency verbs should be the level of 
abstraction that is relevant for false-belief reasoning. 
Use of a Non-Prototypical Construction. A related problem is posed by those 
complements tests that take children’s performance with the long-distance dependency 
construction (e.g., “What did the girl say she was cutting?”) as representative of children’s 
proficiency (e.g., de Villiers & Pyers, 2002; Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Lohmann & 
Tomasello, 2003). First, Dąbrowska (2004) showed that long-distance dependency 
constructions are very infrequent, and that these constructions emerge late in child speech, 
mostly around age 4, relative to declarative complement-clause constructions such as “He 
said he has something to play with for me” at 2;10 (Diessel & Tomasello, 2001). Moreover, 
compared to declarative complement-clause constructions, these long-distance dependency 
constructions show high levels of lexical specificity (Dąbrowska, 2004). Verhagen (2005, p. 
126) suggests that the properties of this stereotypic lexically specific construction “do not 
follow from general properties of complementation, and thus also should not be accounted 
for in such general terms”. Thus, it is unclear how long-distance dependency questions can 
be representative of children’s complement mastery, or why acquisition of this specific 
construction should be related to false-belief development. 
High Executive-Functioning Demands. Many of the previously used complements tests 
place high demands on executive functioning. For example, the Memory for Complements 
test (e.g., de Villiers & Pyers, 2002) places high demands on inhibitory control by requiring 
children to ignore salient visual information in order to pass. The visual stimuli 
accompanying the test questions always show a close-up of the distractor referent, but never 
the target referent (e.g., in the item “The woman said the girl had a bug in her hair. But it was 
only a leaf! What did the woman say the girl had in her hair?” the child sees a close-up of the 
leaf, but no picture of the bug). This test also poses high demands on working memory by 
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always presenting the distractor clause (“But it was only a leaf!”) after the complement 
clause (“The woman said the girl had a bug in her hair”), requiring the child to keep 
information from the complement clause in mind while processing the distractor clause. 
Since previous studies typically do not provide independent measures of memory and 
response inhibition, it is unclear to what degree complement-clause performance reflects 
proficiency with complements or executive function.  
This is problematic because performance on false-belief tests has repeatedly been found 
to correlate with executive functioning (e.g., Carlson et al., 2004; Hughes & Ensor, 2007), 
entailing the risk that correlations between performance with complements and false belief 
could depend on under-investigated shared executive-function requirements. Among the few 
studies controlling executive-function measures, de Villiers and de Villiers (2012) still found 
a unique contribution of complement-clause comprehension to explaining concurrent false-
belief performance, as did Durrleman and Frank (2015) and Burnel et al. (2020), but while 
promising, these concurrent correlations are not ideal for evaluating causality.  
How Early in Development Can We Discern a Complements-False Belief Relationship?  
Traditionally, studies comparing complements and false belief have focused on the 
transition from 3 to 4 years, following Wellman et al.’s (2001) meta-analysis of false-belief 
studies where above-chance performance was found from 48 months. However, the meta-
analysis also found above-chance performance from 40 months when the most supportive 
task modifications were employed. In addition, Rubio-Fernández and Geurts (2013) argued 
that young children may fail explicit false-belief tasks because removing the protagonist from 
the scene disrupts their ability to track the protagonist’s perspective. They demonstrated that 
3-year-olds pass Unseen Location Change tasks if the protagonist stays in the child’s visual 
field throughout the story, reducing the memory demands (see also Rubio-Fernández & 
Geurts (2016) for attention constraints). Finally, Hansen and colleagues (Hansen, 2010; 
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Hansen & Markman, 2005) have argued that young children may fail false-belief tests 
because they interpret the test questions as requests for indirect information about the real 
state of affairs and try to be cooperative by informing the experimenter about reality. They 
found that 3-year-olds were able to pass Location Change, Appearance-Reality, and 
Unexpected Contents tests, when the experimenter stressed shared knowledge about the real 
state of affairs (see also Helming et al., 2014). 
 It appears that 3-year-olds already exhibit false-belief understanding in pragmatically 
transparent tasks with low memory demands. Thus, to argue that complements support 
development in false-belief reasoning, it is necessary to demonstrate a relationship between 
complement-clause acquisition and false belief at a younger age than the transition from 3 to 
4 years. Since 2-and-3-year-olds have typically already begun to acquire complement clauses 
(Boeg Thomsen, 2016; Brandt et al., 2010), it is not inconceivable that they will show an 
influence from complement-clause acquisition on false-belief reasoning. We therefore 
targeted 2-year-olds (from 2;9) and young 3-year-olds (up to 3;5) at our Time 1 testing. 
Mental Verbs in Complement-Clause Constructions 
Finally, it is important to clarify which aspects of complementation may support 
sociocognitive development. One possibility is that children build up an abstract and general 
complement-clause construction which allows them to represent different mental perspectives 
on propositions (Boeg Thomsen, 2016; Verhagen, 2005). On the other hand, experience with 
specific frequent mental verbs in the construction (e.g., “think” and “know”) may help 
children consolidate their understanding of different mental states and degrees of certainty, 
supporting false-belief reasoning (e.g., Brandt et al., 2016; Moore et al., 1990)1.  
                                                 
1 We focus here on mental verbs, but there are also intriguing findings on the relationships between false belief 
and complements of perception vs. communication verbs (see Durrleman et al. (2016, 2017) for French-
speaking children, Perner et al. (2003) for German-speaking children). 
A longitudinal study of complement clauses and false belief 
 10 
 If knowledge of high-frequency mental verbs in complement-clause constructions 
supports mental-state reasoning, seemingly small differences in their linguistic contexts may 
make a difference, too. Diessel and Tomasello (2001) suggested that children treat the high-
frequency string “I think” as an adverb-like epistemic marker without explicit mental-state 
reference. Further, Howard et al. (2008) showed that mothers often use “I think” in certainty 
contexts (e.g., “I think we better tidy up”). Thus, encountering “think” in 1st-person clauses 
(i.e. with “I”) might not provide children with the same support for false-belief understanding 
as 3rd-person clauses (e.g., “He thinks…”) (see also Lewis et al., 2017). Indeed, using the 
Hidden-Objects task, Brandt et al. (2016) compared children’s comprehension of “think” and 
“know” in 1st- and 3rd-person complements with their false-belief performance and found that 
only performance with 3rd-person complements correlated with 4-year-olds’ success on 
questions requiring them to remember their own previous false belief. This suggests a weaker 
relationship between 1st-person complements with these high-frequency verbs and false belief 
(for similar findings, see Gola, 2012). 
In addition, it is unclear whether complement clauses perform a privileged role in 
supporting false-belief understanding, or whether other types of verbal epistemic markers can 
perform the same function. On the one hand, epistemic modals such as “might” and “must” 
indicate degree of certainty towards the proposition and could thus support children in 
building up categories for certainty and uncertainty. Indeed, Moore et al. (1990) found 
correlations between 4-year-olds’ performance with epistemic modals and false beliefs. On 
the other hand, unlike mental verbs in complement-clause constructions, epistemic modals do 
not explicitly attribute the mental state of (un)certainty to a person (consider “I think it’s a 
flower” vs. “It might be a flower”), and thus may not afford the same opportunities to draw 
an explicit link between a mental state and a specific person. 
A longitudinal study of complement clauses and false belief 
 11 
The Current Study 
The main question in the current longitudinal study is whether children’s acquisition of 
perspective-marking language supports developments in their ability to reason about their 
own and others’ mental states. Specifically, we ask whether we can replicate de Villiers and 
Pyers’ (2002) finding that proficiency with complement clauses explains later variance in 
false-belief reasoning when we 1) use pragmatically adjusted false-belief tests without 
complement clauses, 2) test complements proficiency with a fine-grained test suitable for 
capturing degrees of constructional flexibility, and 3) control for a series of background 
variables, including inhibitory control, rule-switching flexibility, working memory, short-
term memory, vocabulary, and grammar. To examine direction of causality in the 
hypothesized relationship between linguistic and sociocognitive development, we also test 
the reverse longitudinal relation, i.e. whether early false-belief reasoning predicts later 
complement-clause proficiency. 
Following studies demonstrating skills with both false belief and complements in 3-year-
olds, we focus on children who are around 3 years of age (range 2;9-3;5) at Time 1 and 
around 3;7 (range 3;3-3;11) at Time 2, asking whether we can discern the roots of a 
relationship at an earlier age than in previous studies.  
Finally, we address the question of which aspects of complementation – if any – help 
children recognize and reason about mental states. Is it the flexible embedding structure, the 
specific type of mental verbs used to indicate degrees of certainty, or do both contribute to 
making children’s belief reasoning more stable and flexible? To answer this last question, we 
employ tests of structural flexibility and understanding of the mental verbs “think” and 
“know” in complement-clause constructions, presented with 1st- versus 3rd-person subjects, 
and compare their role with that of another class of certainty-marking verbs, epistemic 
modals ( “might” and “must”). 




Participants were recruited from Lancaster University Babylab’s database. The vast 
majority of participants in the database come from a white middle-class background and 
more than 70% of the caregivers attended higher education, with about one third holding a 
postgraduate degree. Fifty one 2-and-3-year-olds took part. Three were excluded due to not 
engaging with multiple tasks, leaving 48 children (24 female, age range: 33-41 months, M = 
36.85, SD = 2.34) included at T12. We recruited eight boys and eight girls in each of three 3-
month-windows (2;9-2;11 years; 3;0-3;2 years; 3;3-3;5 years). All participants were 
monolingual English speakers with no known history of language or hearing impairment. 
Forty four percent had no siblings, 37.5% were the youngest sibling, 14.5% were middle 
children and 4% were the oldest child in their family.3 The retention rate for T2 was 93.75% 
(n = 45) with three participants dropping out between T1 and T2. The ages of the children at 
T2 ranged from 39 to 47 months (M = 42.93, SD = 2.46). The study, “Language and social 
cognition in pre-schoolers”, received ethical approval from the Faculty of Arts and Social 
Sciences and Lancaster Management School’s Research Ethics Committee at Lancaster 
University (UREC: FL16283). 
                                                 
2 Sample size was determined by following the standard recommendations for regression modelling of having at 
least 10 observations per variable examined by the model (Harrell, 2001). Aiming to examine 22 variables (one 
was later dropped (see note 5), we needed at least 220 observations, and as we could not present children with 
more than 5 false-belief questions (the tasks build on surprise, and responses get unreliable if children get used 
to their structure), we needed a minimum of 44 participants returning at T2, which with a retention rate at 
around 90 % would require 48 participants at T1. Since we designed the study, sophisticated and precise ways 
of calculating power for mixed-effects models, using simulation, have become available (Brysbaert and Stevens, 
2018). In our regression models (Tables 5 and 6), we therefore report post-hoc power based on 1000 simulations 
per predictor (Brysbaert and Stevens, 2018), using the simR package (Green & MacLeod, 2016). 
3 We included sibling status in our analyses as younger siblings have been found to have an advantage in false-
belief understanding (Lewis et al., 1996; Ruffman et al., 1998). 
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Test Materials 
We collected measures of children’s perspective-marking language (4 tests), social 
cognition (3 tests) and individual differences in executive functioning, memory and general 
language (7 tests). See Table 1 for an overview. 
 
Table 1 
Overview of tests administered at T1 and T2 
 
Perspective-Marking Language  Individual Differences 
Complement-Clause Proficiency (T1: predictor, T2: outcome)  Cognitive Flexibility (T1: control) 
Mental Verbs: 1st person (T1: predictor, T2: outcome)  Motoric Inhibitory Control (T1: control) 
Mental Verbs: 3rd person (T1: predictor, T2: outcome)  Verbal Inhibitory Control (T1: control) 
Epistemic Modals (T1: predictor, T2: outcome)  Short-Term Memory (T1: control) 
  Working Memory (T1: control) 
Social Cognition  Vocabulary (T1: control) 
False Belief (T1: predictor, T2: outcome)  Grammar (T1: control)  
Theory of Mind Precursors (T1: control)   
Discarded task: Implicit False Belief (T1: control)   
 
Perspective-Marking Language 
We assessed aspects of proficiency with perspective-marking language with two tasks. 
The first was designed to capture different levels of abstractness in children’s schemas for 
embedding propositions in complement-clause constructions. The second measured 
understanding of the certainty distinctions marked by the two mental verbs “think” and 
“know” (with 1st vs. 3rd-person complements) and by the two modal verbs “might” and 
“must” (in simple clauses). 
 Complement-Clause Proficiency. The test consists of two parts, Complement Repetition 
and Complement Comprehension (see the Appendix for a list of experimental items and 
Supplementary Materials 1 for details of test design and a full list of training items, 
experimental items and fillers). Complement Repetition utilizes the elicited-imitation 
paradigm (Lust et al., 1996). The task for the child is to repeat eight complement-clause 
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constructions, half of which present high-frequency complement-taking verbs 
(”think”, ”know”) in high-frequency strings (e.g. “I think the monkey likes the fruit”), and 
half of which present high-frequency complement-taking verbs 
(“say”, ”see”, ”hope”, ”pretend”) in lower-frequency clauses in past tense with proper-noun 
subjects (e.g. “Jill said that she was very thirsty”). 
Complement Comprehension utilizes the basic paradigm developed by de Villiers and 
Pyers (1997) in their Memory for Complements test. The child hears a simple main clause 
(distractor) and a complement-clause construction and is asked a comprehension question 
targeting the information in the complement clause and requiring the child to ignore 
information from the distractor clause, as in (4) and (5): 
 
(4)  “Pam saw that her dad picked flowers.  (complement-clause construction) 
Then she found a vase for them.   (distractor clause) 
What did Pam see?” 
 
(5)  “Nick found a rope,      (distractor clause) 
but he shouted that he found a snake. (complement-clause construction) 
What did Nick shout?” 
 
In contrast with Memory for Complements, our task does not re-use the same few 
complement-taking verbs in all items, but presents children with eight different verbs: four 
that are frequent in complement-clause constructions (“say”, “see”, “hope”, “pretend”) and 
four that are highly infrequent in complement-clause constructions in child-directed speech 
(“notice”, “hear”, “shout”, “read”) (see Appendix). Our task also poses lower demands on 
inhibition by avoiding the use of visual stimuli depicting the wrong answer, and it lowers the 
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demands on working memory by only letting the distractor clause intervene between the 
complement clause and the question in half of the items, as in (4), whereas the other half 
present the question directly after the complement clause, as in (5).4  
For the repetition task, the stimuli sentences were pre-recorded and played from a laptop. 
In the comprehension task, the stimuli sentences and questions were read aloud by the 
experimenter (see Supplementary Materials 1 for details on test administration and training 
procedure). For the test questions, responses were coded following a detailed coding manual, 
with distinct criteria for the two parts of the test. To capture fine-grained differences in 
children’s mastery, assessment was graded: responses to each of the 16 items could be 
awarded zero, one or two points (see Supplementary Materials 1 for coding details and 
examples). 
Mental Verbs and Epistemic Modals. To test children’s understanding of the epistemic 
uses of mental verbs in complement-clause constructions and modal verbs in simple clauses, 
we employed an adjusted version of the Hidden Objects task (Brandt et al. 2016; Moore et 
al., 1990). The task for the child is to find a hidden sticker based on the advice from two 
puppet helpers (a pig and a cow) who offer contrasting statements about its location, as in (6). 
 
(6)  Mental Verbs: 1st person 
Pig:  “I know that the sticker is in the blue box.” 
Cow:  “I think that the sticker is in the red box.” 
 
On each trial, one statement is marked with a verb indicating relatively higher certainty 
(“know”), the other with a verb indicating relatively lower certainty (“think”), and success on 
the forced-choice task requires the child to recognize the different degrees of epistemic 
                                                 
4 Children performed significantly better when the distractor sentence came first and did not intervene (p = .02).  
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strength conveyed by the verbs and trust the more certain speaker. Children received six trials 
with 1st-person subjects, as in (6), and six trials with 3rd-person subjects, as in (7). Half of the 
children received the 1st-person trials on day 1 and the 3rd-person trials on day 2, and vice 
versa. 
 
(7)  Mental Verbs: 3rd person 
Boy: “The pig knows that the sticker is in the blue box.” 
Boy: “The cow thinks that the sticker is in the red box.” 
 
The 3rd-person statements were delivered by a boy puppet to avoid a difference in 
speaker authority from the 1st-person condition where the speakers were puppets. All 
sentences were pre-recorded and played from a laptop. We counterbalanced how often each 
puppet/colour box was correct, and whether the more certain statement came first or last. We 
followed the standard practice of not letting the children open the chosen boxes before having 
completed all trials in a set, so that they would not learn from feedback during the trials. To 
reward all children equally, all boxes contained stickers. 
 We adapted the task in two ways. First, to avoid the pragmatic confound that the second 
speaker could introduce doubt over the first speaker’s credibility in sequences such as (6) 
where the less certain statement follows the more certain statement, the puppets entered the 
stage one at a time, making sure they did not overhear each other’s statements and thus did 
not explicitly contradict each other. Second, we used boxes of different sizes and shapes 
(differing between but never within pairs) to enhance speaker credibility by making it more 
plausible that the helpers could remember the hiding places.  
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 We also gave children six trials contrasting the epistemic modal verbs “might” and 
“must”, as in (8). Both modals are frequently used epistemically in children’s input, as 
confirmed by an analysis of the Manchester corpus (Theakston et al., 2001). 
 
(8)  Epistemic Modals 
Pig:  “The sticker must be in the blue box.” 
Cow:  “The sticker might be in the red box.” 
 
If children showed colour, speaker or order biases (such as always choosing their 
favourite colour, the cow’s suggestion, or the last box mentioned), by chance they would get 
3 out of 6 correct without paying attention to the verbs. To make sure that the task measured 
genuine understanding of the certainty contrast, and that the children were not awarded any 
points without attending to the verbs, any raw score from 0 to 3 on each of the three measures 
employing the Hidden Objects task (Mental Verbs: 1st person, Mental Verbs: 3rd person, 
Epistemic Modals) was given 0 points. Raw scores of 4 correct out of 6 were given 1 point 
for nascent attention to verb differences, while raw scores of 5 or 6 correct out of 6 were 
awarded 2 points for stable accuracy of interpretation of the certainty distinction marked by 
the verbs. 
Social Cognition 
False Belief at T2 was our target dependent variable, assessed with a suite of three tests 
requiring verbal or pointing answers. At T1, we used the same explicit tests with different 
contents and also included a measure of Theory of Mind Precursors, i.e. sociocognitive skills 
expected to represent prerequisite steps in the development of false-belief understanding: the 
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understanding of Diverse Desires, Diverse Beliefs and Knowledge Access (Wellman & Liu, 
2004).5  
False Belief. Five false belief questions that required children to remember their own 
previous false belief (two Self questions) or to predict another’s false belief (three Other 
questions) across three different tasks were used: Unseen Location Change (Other), 
Unexpected Contents (Self, Other), and Unexpected Identity (Self, Other). For each task, we 
developed two versions (A and B) with identical structure, but different content. Half of the 
children received version A at T1 and version B at T2 and vice versa. The tasks were adapted 
from standard false-belief tests, with a series of adjustments to avoid known risks of over- or 
underestimating children’s false-belief understanding. 
 Language. The most crucial adjustment was to keep measures of false belief and 
complement clauses distinct by not employing complement clauses (such as “What will Sarah 
think is in the box?”) in the false-belief tests (see Supplementary Materials 3).  
Control Questions Establishing Shared Knowledge about Reality. In all three tasks, 
control questions were used to check whether the child remembered the real state of affairs 
(reality control) and, in Unseen Location Change, the original state of affairs (memory 
control). These control questions were always asked before the false-belief test question to 
make it clear that the child and the experimenter shared knowledge about the real state of 
affairs. This reduces the risk that the child will treat the false-belief test question as a genuine 
request for indirect information about reality (cf. Hansen 2010).6 If the child did not respond 
correctly to a control question, they were shown the real contents or identity again or had the 
                                                 
5 We also aimed to include a measure of Implicit False Belief (using eye tracking to measure anticipatory 
looking), but we did not obtain enough valid data points on this test to justify including it in the longitudinal 
analysis and therefore discarded this measure. See Supplementary Materials 2 for further detail. 
6 We acknowledge that asking the control question first could affect performance in Unseen Location Change 
negatively by drawing attention to the object’s actual location (Rubio-Fernández and Geurts, 2016). Future 
research will have to investigate the trade-off between establishing common ground and drawing attention to the 
actual location by asking the control question first. 
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location-change story told again and were asked the question again. If the child could not 
pass the control question(s) for a task, their response on the target false-belief question was 
not included in the analysis. 
Unseen Location Change. This task tests the child’s ability to attribute a false belief 
about a translocated object’s location to another character who has not witnessed its transfer. 
The test has a narrative format where the child sees and hears the experimenter acting out a 
short story with dolls and props, and follows the basic structure of the standard location 
change tasks developed by Wimmer and Perner (1983: Maxi task) and Baron-Cohen et al. 
(1985: Sally-Anne task), with the following small adjustments: 
Explicit motive for the transfer: We present the location change in a plausible everyday 
story where the child does not have to infer the second agent’s motive for the transfer, which 
is practical and common (A: putting a teddy in a pram to prepare the pram for the child’s nap, 
B: putting a carrot in a pot to cook dinner), and it is explicated verbally. 
Test question with “first”: Following Siegal and Beattie (1991), we ask where the 
protagonist will look “first” for the moved object. This makes it clear to the child that s/he is 
not asked where the protagonist will eventually find the object. 
Keeping the protagonist in sight: We facilitated perspective tracking by keeping the 
protagonist in the child’s visual field throughout the story, following Rubio-Fernández and 
Geurts (2013). The protagonist remained on the table with their back to the transfer scene on 
the other side of a wall barrier, and we verbally made sure that the child was aware that the 
protagonist could not see the central scene. 
Unexpected Contents. Building on Hogrefe et al. (1986) and Perner et al. (1987), this 
task tests the child’s ability to predict another’s false belief and remember their own previous 
false belief about a familiar container’s contents after having obtained new knowledge about 
its real unexpected contents (set A: ball in raisin box, set B: spoon in crayon box).  
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 To avoid the risk that children should use a superficial “memory for own utterance 
strategy” for answering the Self question (cf. Williams & Happé, 2009), rather than 
beginning the test by asking children to verbalize their beliefs about the contents of the box, 
we checked their expectations in an indirect way, by asking the child to either help put some 
raisins into a bowl or find a crayon to draw with. 
Unexpected Identity. Building on Gopnik and Astington (1988), this task tests the child’s 
ability to predict another’s false belief and remember their own previous false belief about the 
identity of a deceptive object (set A: flower-shaped pen, set B: apple-shaped candle), after 
having discovered its real identity. 
Theory of Mind Precursors. Studies using the Theory of Mind scales indicate that 
children’s false-belief understanding builds on a more basic understanding of mental states 
(Wellman et al., 2011; Wellman & Liu, 2004). To assess whether differences in prerequisite 
Theory of Mind (ToM) skills would explain variability in False Belief performance at T2, we 
gave children three tasks from the scales at T1, Diverse Desires, Diverse Beliefs and 
Knowledge Access (further information about False Belief and ToM measures can be found 
in Supplementary Materials 3 and 4). 
Individual Difference Measures 
To test the uniqueness of a potential relationship between complement clauses and false 
belief, we measured a range of executive-functioning, memory, and general-language control 
variables at T1. 
Cognitive Flexibility. Cognitive flexibility was tested with the Dimensional Change 
Card Sort (DCCS, Zelazo, 2006), which assesses children’s ability to switch flexibly between 
conflicting rules for sorting. 
Inhibitory Control. This was tested with two conflict tasks, one motoric and one verbal. 
We tested ability to selectively suppress motoric responses with the Bear/Dragon 
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(Sheep/Crocodile) task (Carlson et al., 2004; Kochanska et al.,1996), where the child hears 
commands for simple physical actions such as “Touch your ears” from two puppets and has 
to ignore commands from one puppet while following commands from the other puppet. 
Ability to suppress a dominant verbal response and initiate a conflicting response was tested 
with the Black/White Stroop (Vendetti et al., 2015), which requires the child to say “black” in 
response to white cards and “white” in response to black cards in 21 intermixed trials. 
Short-Term Memory. This ability was tested with a digit-span task, Recall of Digits 
Forward from the British Ability Scales II (Elliott, 1996), which requires the child to repeat 
strings of ordered digits with items of increasing length. 
Working Memory. This was tested with the Missing Scan Task (Roman et al., 2014), 
which measures the ability to retain and manipulate information in young pre-schoolers. The 
child sees a set of animal figurines, who are then hidden and presented again with one animal 
missing. The task for the child is to report the missing animal, which requires scanning and 
retrieving the contents of immediate memory, and the sets increase in size. 
Vocabulary. Receptive vocabulary was tested with the British Picture Vocabulary Scale 
(BPVS) Third Edition (Dunn et al., 2009), a picture-selection task requiring the child to 
identify the picture depicting the word read by the experimenter on a page with three 
distractor pictures. 
Grammar. Receptive grammar was tested with the subtest Sentence Structure from the 
Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals (CELF) Preschool 2 (Wiig et al., 2006), a 
picture-selection task requiring the child to identify the picture representing the sentence read 
by the experimenter on a page with three distractor pictures.  
Procedure and Principles for Task Ordering 
The study was conducted in three separate sessions: two sessions at T1 and one session at 
T2. Each session lasted up to an hour, including warm-up play. On average, the second T1 
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session fell 9 days (SD = 3.9) after the first, and the T2 session on average 6 months (181 
days, SD = 13.7) after the second T1 session. The children were tested individually in a 
laboratory room with limited visual and auditory distraction by either the first author or the 
third author (half each). Caregivers accompanied their children during testing, but were 




Overview of task ordering within and across sessions at T1 and T2. Half of the children 
received Set A, the other half Set B. 
 
 Set A Set B 
 SESSION 1 (T1) 
Implicit False Belief FB1 FB2 
Working Memory Missing Scan Task 
False Belief Unexpected Contents: Ball in raisin box Unexpected Identity: Apple-candle 
False Belief  Unseen Location Change: Carrot story 
Short-Term Memory Forward Digit Span 
Complement-Clause Proficiency Complement Repetition: A Complement Repetition: B 
Mental Verbs Hidden Objects: 1st Person Hidden Objects: 3rd Person 
Epistemic Modals Hidden Objects: Epistemic Modals  
Verbal Inhibitory Control Black/White 
Receptive Vocabulary British Picture Vocabulary Scale 
 SESSION 2 (T1) 
Implicit False Belief FB2 FB1 
False Belief Unexpected Identity: Flower-pen Unexpected Contents: Spoon in crayon box 
False Belief Unseen Location Change: Teddy story  
Complement-Clause Proficiency Complement Comprehension: A Complement Comprehension: B 
Mental Verbs Hidden Objects: 3rd Person Hidden Objects: 1st Person 
Epistemic Modals  Hidden Objects: Epistemic Modals 
Cognitive Flexibility Dimensional Change Card Sort 
ToM Precursors Diverse Desires 
 Diverse Beliefs 
 Knowledge Access 
Receptive Grammar CELF-4: Sentence Structure 
Motoric Inhibitory Control Sheep/Crocodile 
 SESSION 3 (T2) 
False Belief Unexpected Contents: Spoon in crayon box Unexpected Identity: Flower-pen 
False Belief Unseen Location Change: Carrot story Unseen Location Change: Teddy story 
Complement-Clause Proficiency Complement Repetition: B Complement Repetition: A 
False Belief Unexpected Identity: Apple-candle Unexpected Contents: Ball in raisin box 
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Mental Verbs Hidden Objects: 1st Person Hidden Objects: 3rd Person 
Epistemic Modals Hidden Objects: Epistemic Modals  
Complement-Clause Proficiency Complement Comprehension: B Complement Comprehension: A 
Mental Verbs Hidden Objects: 3rd Person Hidden Objects: 1st Person 
Epistemic Modals  Hidden Objects: Epistemic Modals 
 
Interrater Reliability 
We calculated interrater reliability for the False Belief tests, the Hidden Objects task, and 
the Complement Clause Proficiency measure. Responses from 10 of the 48 children (21%) 
were coded (and transcribed) by a second rater. There was no disagreement about responses 
in the False Belief tests or in the Hidden Objects task. 
 Complement Clause Proficiency had both a transcription and a coding component. For 
transcription reliability, the two transcribers agreed on whether the word had been produced 
in 95% of the cases (750 words out of 793), and only for ten responses, word-transcription 
disagreement would affect overall response coding: for nine responses, resulting in a 1-point 
difference, for one response in a 2-point difference (Cohen’s Kappa: κ = 0.927, weights: 
squared, responses: 160, raters: 2, z = 11.7). All responses with transcription disagreement 
were transcribed by a third rater and the final decision discussed and made collectively. For 
coding reliability, a weighted Kappa statistic taking into account the ordered character of the 
ratings showed that agreement was near perfect (κ = 0.988, weights: squared, utterances: 160, 
raters: 2, z = 12.5). The few responses with coding disagreement were coded by a third rater, 
and the final decision discussed and made collectively. 
Results 
Our central aim was to test whether T1 performance with complement-clause 
constructions and mental verbs would predict variance in T2 performance with False Belief 6 
months later when T1 performance with False Belief as well as individual differences in 
Theory of Mind precursors, executive functioning and general language were controlled. We 
address this focal question by means of a generalized linear mixed-effects model analysis. 
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We also examine whether T1 performance with False Belief predicts variance in T2 
performance with complement-clause constructions. 
 As a background for the mixed-effects analyses, we first give an overview of 
performance and correlations between measures at T1 and of overall group-level progression 
on our central False Belief measure from T1 to T2. All analyses were run on the focal sample 
of 45 children who returned at T2, i.e. excluding the three children that only participated in 
T1 testing. 
Preliminary Analyses: Time 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 3 summarizes T1 performance on our test battery, and below, we discuss a few 
issues with missing data as well as the extent to which the tasks captured individual variation, 
to bear in mind when we evaluate the role of these T1 predictors in explaining variance in 
false-belief reasoning at T2. 
First, for the Sheep/Crocodile task, measuring Motoric Inhibitory Control, we had to 
discard data from 24% of the children (11 out of 45) because they did not meet the inclusion 
criteria. Either they did not pass the practice trials (i.e. they never learned the rule of ignoring 
the crocodile) or the sheep-command control trials (i.e. they ignored both the crocodile and 
the sheep, instead of selectively suppressing response to the crocodile). For the 34 children 
included there was a ceiling effect (M = 4.0, SD = 1.6, max score: 5), indicating a reduced 
capacity for capturing individual variation. 
A similar problem with missing data points pertained to our ToM Precursors measure. 
Half of the sample (22 of 45 children) failed the control question for Knowledge Access, 
indicating that they did not understand the task and invalidating their test responses for this 
subtask. We therefore excluded scores from Knowledge Access for all children and only 
included scores from Diverse Desires and Diverse Beliefs in our aggregate ToM score (range 
0-2) which allowed us to examine the role of ToM Precursors in the full sample since there 
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were no problems with failed control questions on these subtasks. However, the children 
generally performed very well on this measure (M = 1.56, SD = 0.62, max score: 2), 
indicating that the ToM Precursors tasks had limited capacity for capturing individual 
variation in social cognition at this age. 
For Cognitive Flexibility (measured with the Dimensional Change Card Sort task), 
children generally performed poorly (M = 1.88, SD = 2.57, max score: 6), in line with 
previous findings from children below 4 years of age (Zelazo, 2006). 
For each of the three verb-knowledge measures derived from the Hidden Objects task 
(Mental Verbs: 1st person (M = 0.47, SD = 0.66, max score: 2), Mental Verbs: 3rd person (M = 
0.47, SD = 0.73, max score: 2), Epistemic Modals (M = 0.40, SD = 0.58, max score: 2)), there 
was also limited variability. At T1, the majority of children showed no signs of attending to 
the certainty distinctions marked by the verb pairs, but consistently based their choices on 
either a specific colour, a specific puppet helper or the first or last box mentioned, thus 
getting a score of 0.  
 
Table 3 
Means, standard deviations, ranges and missing data points for T1 predictors 
 
 





   
 
 
ToM Precursors (incl. 
Knowledge Access) 
2.52 0.79 0-3 3 22 of 45 (49%) 
ToM Precursors (without 
Knowledge Access) 
1.56 0.62 0-2 2 0 
False Belief 2.00 1.49 0-4 5 17 of 225 (8%) 




Short-Term Memory 7.47 3.42 0-15 36 0 
Working Memory 3.27 1.32 1-6 6 0 
Cognitive Flexibility 1.88 2.57 0-6 6 3 of 45 (7%) 
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Motoric Inhibitory Control 4.00 1.60 0-5 5 11 of 45 (24%) 
Verbal Inhibitory Control 8.77 5.64 0-21 21 1 of 45 (2%) 
General Language 
   
 
 
Receptive Vocabulary 42.76 14.12 17-77 120 0 







9.45 6.60 1-26 32 1 of 45 (2%) 
Mental Verbs: 1st person 0.47 0.66 0-2 2 0 
Mental Verbs: 3rd person 0.47 0.73 0-2 2 0 
Epistemic Modals 0.40 0.58 0-2 2 0 
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Table 4  
Spearman’s correlations between T1 predictors 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 False Belief               
2 ToM (incl. Knowledge Access) -.20              
3 ToM -.05 -.99***             
4 Age -.29† -.12 -.04            
5 Short-Term Memory -.40* -.23 -.20 -.34*           
6 Working Memory -.22 -.13 -.20 -.07 -.04          
7 Cognitive Flexibility -.20 -.03 -.16 -.26† -.23 -.05         
8 Motoric Inhibitory Control -.08 -.10 -.07 -.18 -.39* -.11 -.18        
9 Verbal Inhibitory Control -.16 -.07 -.12 -.50***  -.47** -.01 -.23 -.51**       
10 Receptive Vocabulary -.25 -.23 -.16 -.47** -.47** -.16 -.23 -.56*** -.54***      
11 Receptive Grammar -.18 -.08 -.11 -.31* -.48*** -.21 -.03 -.52** -.30* -.46**     
12 Complement-Clause Proficiency -.27 -.17 -.02 -.55*** -.44** -.02 -.23 -.33† -.51*** -.60***   .33*    
13 Mental Verbs: 1st person -.19 -.08 -.13 -.21 -.25 -.22 -.12 -.01 -.04 -.06   .23   .05   
14 Mental Verbs: 3rd person -.15 -.15 -.08 -.10 -.11 -.08 -.05 -.01 -.16 -.00   .11   .18   .11  
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Table 4 presents an overview over concurrent correlations between our T1 predictors. For 
False Belief, the only significant correlation is with Short-Term Memory (rs = .40, p = .003). 
The absence of other correlations is somewhat surprising since other studies have repeatedly 
found concurrent correlations between false-belief reasoning, language proficiency and 
executive functioning, but can likely be explained by the younger age group we were 
targeting at T1 (age 2;9-3;5). 
 Our central predictor variable, Complement-Clause Proficiency, was significantly 
associated with many of our control measures, with positive correlations of high strength with 
Age (rs = .55, p = .0001), Receptive Vocabulary (rs = .60, p < .0001) and Verbal Inhibitory 
Control (rs = .51, p = .0005) as well as positive correlations of intermediate strength with 
Receptive Grammar (rs = .33, p = .03) and Short-Term Memory (rs = .44, p = .003). These 
correlations with both general language, memory and inhibitory control confirm the relevance 
of including such control measures when examining the developmental relationship between 
complement clauses and false belief. 
 For our three measures for understanding the certainty-marking function of mental verbs 
and epistemic modals, we found no significant associations with any other measures, likely 
due to the generally poor performance on the Hidden Objects test, yielding little variation in 
scores. 
False Belief Progression from Time 1 to Time 2 
At T1 children on average got two out of five false-belief questions correct (M = 2.00, SD 
= 1.49, range: 0-4). Their performance approached falling significantly below chance (one-
sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test: V = 229, p = .061), suggesting that their responses were 
not random, but biased towards the real state of affairs rather than the belief state targeted by 
the false-belief question. 
A longitudinal study of complement clauses and false belief 
 29 
At T2 children on average responded correctly to half of the five questions (M = 2.6, SD 
= 1.03, range: 1-5). As a group, their performance was not above chance (one-sample 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test: V = 446.5, p = .615), but it was significantly better than 6 months 
earlier (Wilcoxon paired signed-rank test: V = 73, p = .046), see Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1  
Raincloud plot showing correct responses on the five false-belief questions at T1 and T2, with 
raw scores plotted (jittered) under the probability densities with means and 95 % confidence 
intervals. Plot produced in R following Allen et al. (2019). 
 
 
Predictors of False Belief at Time 2 
Our main question was whether performance with complement-clause constructions and 
with mental verbs in complement-clause constructions at T1 (mean age: 3;1) would explain 
variance in performance with False Belief at T2 (6 months later) whilst controlling for initial 
levels of false-belief reasoning and Theory of Mind precursors as well as individual 
differences in executive functioning and general language. To evaluate this question, we 
fitted a generalized linear mixed effects model to the dependent variable False Belief at T2 in 
the statistical environment R (version 3.6.0, R Core Team, 2019), using the package lme4 
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(Bates et al., 2015), including random effects of participant, item (i.e., false-belief question), 
experimenter, set version and set order and starting from the full model including all our 
control and explanatory variables, which apart from our T1 test measures included age (in 
months), gender, and sibling status (first child vs. younger sibling). We then fitted the model 
following the principle of backwards selection and a significance-based approach, testing step 
by step (comparing models by ANOVA) whether discarding the least significant predictor 
from the model would significantly decrease the goodness of fit of the model (Gries, 2013). 
Table 5 summarizes the final model, and Figure 2 represents this model visually, plotting the 




Summary of Generalized Linear Mixed Effects Model fitted to the dependent variable T2 
False Belief  
 
Random effects          
Groups Name Variance Std. Dev.    
Participant (Intercept) 1.559e-07 3.949e-04   
Item (Intercept) 2.367e-01 4.865e-01   
Experimenter (Intercept) 1.263e-10 1.124e-05   
Set (Intercept) 1.836e-09 4.285e-05   
Order (Intercept) 1.122e-10 1.059e-05   
Number of observations: 200, Participants: 44, Items: 5, Experimenters: 2, Sets: 2, Orders: 2 
           
Fixed effects          
  Estimate Std. Error z Value Pr(>|z|) Power (95% CI) 
(Intercept) -1.00 0.37 -2.698 0.0070 **  
False Belief 0.71 0.32 2.213 0.0269 * .62 (.58, .65) 
Complement-Clause Proficiency      0.05 0.02 2.144 0.0321 * .59 (.56, .62) 
Mental Verbs: 3rd Person 0.45 0.22 2.067 0.0388 * .53 (.50, .56) 
Significance codes: ‘**’ .01; ‘*’ .05  
 
Note. The number of participants in the final model is 44 because one participant did not 
respond to the Complement Clause Proficiency task at T1. 
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The mixed-effects regression analysis confirmed that children’s proficiency with 
complement clauses at age 2;9-3;5 was a positive predictor of their likelihood of passing 
false-belief tests six months later. In addition, the regression analysis also demonstrated a 
unique contribution from children’s understanding of the certainty differences marked by the 
mental verbs most frequently used in complement-clause constructions: “think” and “know”7. 
However, only children’s performance with mental verbs in 3rd-person complements (e.g. “he 
knows”) explained variance in later false-belief reasoning, while no relationship emerged for 
mental verbs in 1st-person complements (e.g. “I know”).  
 
Figure 2  
Marginal effects plot showing the effects of the three T1 predictors False Belief, 
Complement-Clause Proficiency and Mental Verbs: 3rd Person on T2 False Belief. The plot is 
generated from the glmer model in Table 5 using the ggeffects package (Lüdecke 2018) in R. 
The plot is divided in panels to illustrate the advantage of passing (right panel) over failing 
(left panel) a false-belief question at T1 for passing the corresponding false-belief question at 
T2. 
 
                                                 
7 In principle, the influence from mental-verb knowledge could be explained as a superficial task factor. While 
our false-belief questions avoided complement clauses, two out of five questions did employ the verb “think”, in 
the representational-change Self questions, e.g. “What did you first think about this box? Did you think about 
raisins or a ball first?” To check whether performance on these two Self questions could be driving the 
correlation, we tested interactions between Mental Verbs and Presence of the verb “think”. This follow-up 
analysis showed no difference in the role of mental-verb knowledge for false-belief questions with and without 
“think”, thus confirming that the effect of mental-verb knowledge is genuine and not a task factor. 





Predictors of Complement-Clause Proficiency at Time 2 
Having found proficiency with complement-clause constructions to predict false-belief 
reasoning 6 months later, we wanted to examine whether this predictive relationship was 
bidirectional. If so, we would expect false-belief performance at T1 to predict variation in 
complement-clause proficiency at T2, and to evaluate this question, we fitted a new series of 
linear mixed-effects models in R to the dependent variable T2 Complement-Clause 
Proficiency. Using the packages lme4 (Bates et al., 2015) and lmerTest (Kuznetsova et al., 
2017), we followed the same strategy of stepwise backwards selection as we did for the 




Summary of Linear Mixed Effects Model fitted to the dependent variable T2 Complement-
Clause Proficiency: Final model  
 
Random effects           
Groups Name Variance Std. Dev.     
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Participant (Intercept) 0.03846 0.1961    
Item (Intercept) 0.08433 0.2904    
Experimenter (Intercept) 4.682e-09 6.842e-05    
Set (Intercept) 1.778e-08 1.333e-04    
Order (Intercept) 1.173e-08 1.083e-04    
Residual  0.4347 0.6593    
Number of observations: 680, Participants: 43, Items: 16, Experimenters: 2, Sets: 2, Orders, 2 
            
Fixed effects           
  Estimate S.E. df t Value   Pr(>|t|) Power (95% CI) 
(Intercept) -0.44 0.21   42.86    -2.126    .0393 *      
False Belief 0.07 0.03 35.20 2.414    .0211 * .67 (.64, .70) 
Short-Term Memory 0.03 0.02 35.75 1.853    .0722 . .46 (.43, .49) 
Working Memory 0.06 0.03 35.49 1.851    .0725 . .47 (.44, .50) 
Receptive Vocabulary 0.02 0.00 36.35 4.634 < .0001 *** .99 (.98, 1.0) 
Complement-Clause Proficiency 0.12    0.04 641.02 2.904    .0038 ** .83 (.81, .86) 
Mental Verbs: 1st person 0.27 0.08 35.33 3.609    .0009 *** .93 (.92, .95) 
Epistemic Modals -0.27    0.08 34.90 -3.395    .0017 ** .91 (.89, .92) 
Significance codes: ‘***’ .001; ‘**’ .01; ‘*’ .05; ‘.’ .1  
 
Note: The number of participants in the final model is 43 because one participant did not 
respond to the Complement Clause Proficiency task at T1 and another did not respond to the 
Complement Clause Proficiency task at T2. 
 
Table 6 demonstrates continuity in Complement-Clause Proficiency from T1 to T2, with 
T1 performance being a significant predictor of T2 performance. Crucially, however, False 
Belief at T1 also contributed uniquely to explaining variance in T2 Complement-Clause 
Proficiency (illustrated in Figure 3). This result suggests a bidirectional relationship where 
developments in attention to mental states support developments in children’s gradual 
construction of abstract schemas for complement-clause constructions, as well as the other 
way around. 
Among the other significant predictors, it is worth noting that children’s performance 
with Mental Verbs (1st person) in complement-clause constructions at T1 was also a 
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significant independent predictor of Complement-Clause Proficiency 6 months later (see 
Figure 3).  
We also fitted models to each of our three T2 measures of verb knowledge (Mental 
Verbs: 1st person, Mental Verbs: 3rd person and Epistemic Modals) to check whether T1 False 
Belief was a significant predictor of later understanding of the certainty-marking function of 
these verbs. T1 False Belief did not emerge as a significant predictor in any of these models.  
 
Figure 3  
Marginal effects plot showing the effects of the T1 predictors False Belief and Mental Verbs: 
1st Person on T2 Complement-Clause Proficiency while holding the other predictors in the 
model constant. The plot is generated from the lmer model in Table 6 using the ggeffects 






The main aim of this longitudinal study was to investigate whether acquisition of 
perspective-marking language facilitates development in children’s social cognition. 
Specifically, we examined whether children’s proficiency with complement-clause 
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constructions around the age of 3 years would explain variance in their false-belief reasoning 
6 months later. Our results showed that this was indeed the case. Both children’s performance 
with false belief and with complement clauses at T1 (M = 3;1 years) contributed 
independently to predicting false-belief performance at T2 (M = 3;7 years). However, the 
relationship appears to be bidirectional, with advances in belief-reasoning also supporting 
developments in children’s gradual acquisition of complement-clause constructions. 
Two aspects of complementation, structural flexibility in children’s schemas for 
complement-clause constructions as well as understanding of mental verbs used in 
complement-clause constructions both contributed uniquely to predicting later false-belief 
reasoning. We discuss the complementary roles of these two aspects of complementation in 
more detail below. 
 The current study provides a more stringent test of the developmental relationship 
between complement-clause acquisition and false-belief development than usually seen, as it 
avoided the widespread confound of using complement clauses in the false-belief tests. 
Further, it included a series of executive-functioning, memory and general-language 
measures, allowing us to exclude with some confidence the possibility that the relationship 
between complement clauses and false belief could simply be explained by success on both 
tasks depending on the same executive-functioning, memory or linguistic skills. We return to 
the lack of effects of our executive-functioning and memory measures below. 
The Role of a General Schema for Complement-Clause Constructions 
Why would children who were better at understanding and repeating complement-clause 
constructions like “Ann said [that she was very hungry]” around the age of 3 years be more 
likely to answer false-belief questions correctly 6 months later? To answer this question, it is 
useful to look at the basic communicative function of complement-clause constructions. The 
fact that this type of syntax has evolved in the majority of languages of the world (Dixon, 
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2006; Noonan, 1985) indicates that this construction serves a fundamental function in human 
communication (see also Moore, 2020). According to cognitive linguistics, the central 
function of complement-clause constructions is to provide language users with a flexible 
format for explicating the relationship between ideas and the persons these ideas belong to, 
i.e. to anchor ideas about the world in human conceptualizers (Verhagen, 2005). Whether we 
say, “I think it’s in the cupboard” or “Mum says it’s in the cupboard”, we are specifying that 
the idea that something is in the cupboard is not just an objective fact about the world, but an 
idea that belongs to a person with a specific attitude towards and perspective on that idea. In 
this way, complement-clause constructions are a specialized grammatical means for talking 
about invisible mental states and to highlight conflicts between different mental states as well 
as between mental states and reality. 
 Complement-clause constructions are certainly not the only linguistic way to 
communicate about relationships between persons and ideas or to highlight contrasts between 
ideas and reality, but as part of the grammar of a language, they offer children constantly 
recurring evidence for the communicative relevance of specifying mental aspects of 
situations, i.e. whom ideas belong to and how. Crosslinguistic experiments in the thinking-
for-speaking tradition (Slobin, 1996) have provided evidence that when a grammatical 
phenomenon in a language requires attention to certain aspects of situations, language users 
are likely to monitor and store such aspects of experience routinely so that it will be easy to 
communicate about later (Bowerman & Choi, 2003; Okuno et al., 2020). In the same way, 
growing up in a linguistic community where complement clauses are part of the grammar 
may train children to pay attention to and keep track of relationships between persons and 
ideas, and such routine monitoring of mental aspects of experience may support children’s 
developing abilities to represent and reason about beliefs.  
The Role of Mental Verbs in Complement-Clause Constructions 
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To examine whether not only the complement-clause construction itself, but also 
familiarity with the specific mental verbs frequently used in the construction supports 
developments in mental-state reasoning, we tested children’s ability to differentiate between 
“think” and “know”. The results confirmed a unique contribution from mental-verb 
knowledge (measured with the Hidden Objects task) in addition to proficiency with the 
complement construction itself (measured with Complement-Clause Proficiency). Our results 
thus confirm the relationship between mental-verb knowledge and false belief found by 
Moore et al. (1990) and Brandt et al. (2016) using false-belief tests without complements and 
substantiate their hypothesis of a causal influence from mental-verb acquisition on mental-
state reasoning with longitudinal data. When proficiency with “think” and “know” in 
complement-clause constructions predicts later false-belief performance, a likely explanation 
is that hearing these mental verbs in situations with different degrees of certainty invites 
children to compare and generalize over these situations, thus supporting them in building up 
stable concepts of knowledge and belief. 
Further, the facilitatory role of mental verbs with complements appears to be superior to 
another type of verbal epistemic marking, i.e. epistemic modal verbs. Children’s performance 
with the two high-frequency modals “might” and “must” in the same Hidden Objects task at 
T1 did not explain any variance in false-belief performance at T2. A straightforward 
explanation of this lack of effect was children’s poor performance with modals at T1. Our 
results do not exclude the possibility that epistemic modals help consolidate categorization of 
mental states of certainty and uncertainty at older ages, but any potential support would 
appear to be secondary to the one provided by mental verbs with complements. A likely 
explanation for the privileged role of the latter is that they explicitly anchor the proposition 
presented in the complement clause in a conceptualizer (the subject of the complement-taking 
verb) (e.g. “The cow thinks that the sticker is in the red box”) whereas the epistemic modals 
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leave the presence of a certain vs. uncertain conceptualizer implicit (e.g. “The sticker might 
be in the red box”). 
While our results establish a special role for mental verbs, they also suggest a possible 
interplay with the specific types of complement-clause constructions they occur in. Whereas 
children’s sensitivity to the contrasting degrees of certainty marked by mental verbs in 3rd-
person complements (e.g. “the cow thinks”) did explain variance in later mental-state 
reasoning, their sensitivity to the same contrast in 1st-person complements (e.g. “I think”) did 
not (for similar results see Brandt et al. (2016)). As with the epistemic modals, children were 
generally performing poorly with 1st-person complements at T1, with only 4 out of 45 
children (9%) consistently differentiating between “I think” and “I know”, in line with 
previous findings of chance performance in 3-year-olds (Brandt et al., 2016; Moore et al., 
1990).  
Why were the 2-to-3-year-olds performing so poorly with the 1st-person complements? 
The key reason is probably that the Hidden Objects test measures sensitivity to certainty 
contrasts. This makes it a useful task for testing children’s differentiation of expressions with 
a clear certainty contrast (e.g. “he thinks/knows”; “might/must”), but it is less clear what it 
can tell us about children’s understanding of “I think” and “I know” since, as demonstrated 
by Howard et al. (2008), children very often hear “I think” in situations where the speaker is 
absolutely certain. In real life children may depend on contextual cues to discern whether the 
1st-person complement is used for indicating certainty or uncertainty.  
The use of “I think” in certainty contexts makes it likely that present-tense 1st-person 
complements with “think” and “know” provide children with less reliable cues for carving 
out distinct categories of belief and knowledge than 3rd-person complements. Nevertheless, 
our finding that T1 Mental Verbs: 1st person was a significant predictor of T2 Complement-
Clause Proficiency suggests that children do not simply process constructions with “I think” 
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as adverb-like markers autonomous from the complement-clause construction. Since the 
Hidden Objects task may not be the most appropriate test for capturing proficiency with 1st-
person complements, we have examined the role of 1st-person complements in supporting 
false-belief reasoning directly in a new training study (Boeg Thomsen et al., in prep.). Here, 
children who had mental-state-rich experience mediated with 1st-person complements 
advanced significantly more in false-belief reasoning than children trained with simple 
clauses, supporting the interpretation that the lack of relationship with false-belief reasoning 
in the current study may be a task effect. 
Executive Functioning and Memory 
None of our T1 executive-functioning or memory measures emerged as significant 
predictors of later false-belief reasoning. While we had reduced ability to detect the potential 
influence of motoric inhibitory control due to missing data, this was not the case for our other 
executive function and memory measures, and the lack of a predictive relationship is 
somewhat surprising since previous longitudinal studies with English-speaking children 
found earlier executive-functioning skills to predict later ToM performance (Carlson et al., 
2004; Hughes & Ensor, 2007). Part of the explanation may be that these studies used an 
aggregate ToM measure, for when Carlson et al. (2004) tested the influence of T1 executive 
functioning on T2 false belief specifically, they did not find a significant predictive 
relationship. Further, age may play a role, as we targeted children who were older at T1 than 
the two-year-olds in these two studies. Thus, differences in executive functioning could play 
their prime role in sociocognitive development at an earlier stage, and indeed, Hughes and 
Ensor (2007) did not find any significant effect of executive functioning at their T2 (38.5 
months) on ToM at T3 (50.5 months). 
Results from correlational studies with older children are also mixed: Burnel et al. (2020) 
found that both complement clauses, flexibility and working memory explain concurrent 
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variance in ToM tasks in French-speaking 3-11-year-olds. On the other hand, Durrleman and 
Frank (2015) did not find correlations between either inhibition or flexibility and verbal false-
belief tasks in French-speaking children with autism (6-16 years) or typical development (4-9 
years), and neither did de Villiers & de Villiers (2012) in English-speaking deaf (4-7 years) 
or hearing (3-5 years) children.  
While the current study shows that the relationship between complement-clause 
proficiency and false-belief reasoning does not simply depend on shared executive-function 
requirements, it leaves other questions open regarding the role of executive functioning in 
ToM development.  
The Role of False-Belief Reasoning in Complement-Clause Acquisition 
This study examined longitudinal relationships between the acquisition of perspective-
marking language and sociocognitive development in children around age 3 and we found 
evidence for both directions of influence. This result aligns with the findings in Milligan et al. 
(2007), who conducted a meta-analysis of longitudinal relationships between language ability 
and false-belief performance and found significant effect sizes for both directions of 
influence. It also aligns with current proposals for a bidirectional relation between language 
and ToM in ontogenetic and phylogenetic development. For example, Rubio-Fernández 
(2020) argues that children’s acquisition of deictic markers both depends on and also 
supports their understanding of others’ perspectives, and based on computational modelling, 
Woensdregt et al. (2020) suggest a bidirectional evolutionary relationship between word 
learning and sociocognitive development.  
 On the other hand, the result contrasts with the main conclusion in de Villiers and Pyers’ 
(2002) longitudinal study where early complement-clause proficiency was found to predict 
later false-belief performance, but not vice versa. While de Villiers and Pyers take this 
finding to support the hypothesis that false-belief representation depends on complement-
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clause syntax, it is worth keeping in mind that their complement-clause test was not designed 
to capture fine-grained differences, making it a less sensitive tool for evaluating longitudinal 
relationships. Further, the highlighted unidirectional relationship is only found from their 
Time 2 (age 3;5-4;2) to their Time 3 (age 3;9-4;6), where the children are generally older 
than in our study. De Villiers and Pyers do not report any general analyses of predictive 
relationships from Time 1 (age 3;1-3;10) to Time 2 (age 3;5-4;2), but they do analyse the 
relationship between one location-change false-belief task and complement clauses, and here 
they do find a bidirectional relationship. 
 Thus, in both de Villiers and Pyers (2002) and the current study, we see evidence of 
developments in complement-clause acquisition and social cognition supporting each other 
mutually in 3-year-olds. If complement-clause mastery and false-belief understanding are 
thought of as absolute abilities that a child either has or has not acquired, such an interplay 
might seem implausible, and it becomes important to determine which of the two steps is a 
prerequisite for the other. On the other hand, if both developmental processes are gradual and 
stretched out over a long time – as demonstrated for complement-clause acquisition by 
Brandt et al. (2016) and Diessel and Tomasello (2001) and for false-belief development by 
Amsterlaw and Wellman (2006) – the two processes would have plenty of time to affect and 
interact with each other.  
The sections above have focussed on the ways in which children’s increasing experience 
with complement clauses and mental verbs is likely to promote development in their 
representation of mental states. As for the reverse direction of influence, it is highly likely 
that having a nascent understanding of mental states would both be a strong incentive for 
children to acquire linguistic tools for communicating about these mental phenomena in 
increasingly nuanced ways and make it easier for them to discern the function of the 
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complement clauses they encounter in their input (for a similar argument about such an 
interplay in language evolution see Moore (2020)).  
Future Directions 
While this study provides strong evidence that children’s proficiency with complement-
clause constructions and mental verbs around age 3 contributes to explaining differences in 
their false-belief reasoning half a year later, it also leaves some questions open. 
First, even though finding a longitudinal relationship supports the hypothesis of a causal 
influence from acquisition of perspective-marking language on sociocognitive development, 
training studies can yield clearer evidence of causation. While previous training studies have 
addressed this question (Gola, 2012; Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Lohmann & Tomasello, 
2003; Mo et al., 2014), their conclusions are uncertain because they used complement clauses 
in their post-test false-belief questions and did not control for differences in executive 
functioning (but see Durrleman et al. (2019) for promising training effects in different 
diagnostic groups). We have therefore also conducted a new training study with English-
speaking 3-year-olds, using the same battery of false-belief and complement-clause tests as 
the current study (Boeg Thomsen et al., in prep.). 
Second, the current study showed a clear difference between mental verbs occurring with 
1st-person vs. 3rd-person complements, with only 3rd-person mental verbs significantly 
predicting later false-belief reasoning. While this result aligns with previous findings (Brandt 
et al., 2016; Gola, 2012), the Hidden Object test may not be ideal for assessing understanding 
of 1st-person complements, and in our new training study, we therefore compare the influence 
of being exposed to 1st- vs. 3rd-person complements directly. For mental verbs, we should 
also emphasize that we only tested them in complement-clause constructions, not in simple 
clauses (e.g. “The cow thinks so”) – because our aim was to discern whether mental-verb 
knowledge was aiding false-belief reasoning in addition to syntactic proficiency with the 
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construction. This focus makes it impossible to conclude anything about mental verbs in 
general, and new studies are needed to evaluate whether familiarity with mental verbs in 
simple clauses shows the same predictive relationship with later false-belief reasoning. 
 Finally, it is worth stressing that while this study focused on the role of children’s 
acquisition of complement clauses and mental verbs for developments in false-belief 
reasoning, we are not arguing that this is the whole story. Learning about the invisible mental 
world and its possible contrasts with the visible world is a complex process, and we would 
expect children to attend to whatever verbal and nonverbal cues their experience offers them 
and to recruit whatever general cognitive abilities they possess in this process. Thus, noticing 
surprised expressions in others’ faces or behaviours such as looking for an object in a place 
where it is not or hearing utterances that contradict each other or contrasting verbal labels for 
the same object may all be sources that the child draws on when building up a stable and 
flexible understanding of beliefs. What the current longitudinal study shows is that acquiring 
the perspective-marking grammar of complement clauses with its recurring anchoring of 
ideas in persons and its flexible format for communicating about false beliefs is likely to 
support the child in this complex process. 
Conclusions 
The majority of languages in the world offer speakers a linguistic tool for communicating 
flexibly and explicitly about their own and others’ invisible perspectives on ideas: the 
complement-clause construction. In languages such as English, this construction further hosts 
mental verbs that categorize epistemic states such as belief and knowledge. For young 
children in the process of learning about the invisible mental world, previous studies have 
suggested that acquisition of the perspective-marking grammar of complement clauses 
supports their developing ability to reason flexibly about false beliefs. Addressing critical 
methodological uncertainties in previous studies and targeting children at a younger age, the 
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current longitudinal study provides strong support for the hypothesis that complement-clause 
acquisition supports development in false-belief reasoning. Using false-belief tests without 
complement clauses, testing complement-clause proficiency comprehensively, and 
controlling for individual differences in executive functioning, memory, and general 
language, we found that two aspects of complement-clause acquisition (structural proficiency 
and mental-verb knowledge) around age three play independent roles in predicting false-
belief performance six months later. Further, as we also found false-belief reasoning around 
age three to predict later complement-clause proficiency, our study yields evidence for a 
bidirectional relationship between linguistic and sociocognitive development. 
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Appendix 
Experimental Items for Complement Repetition 
 (B) Jean hoped that the tea was hot. 
(A) You know the boy has a drum. 
(B) John saw that his mum ate sweets. 
(A) You think the doll is very pretty. 
(B) Dan pretended that he brushed his hair. 
(A) I think the monkey likes the fruit. 
(B) Ann said that she was very hungry. 
(A) I know the coat is really dirty. 
Experimental Items for Complement Comprehension 
 (C) Jack hoped that the cat was sweet. Then he stroked it. What did Jack hope? 
 (D) Nick found a rope, but he shouted that he found a snake. What did Nick shout? 
(D) The park was still open, but Mrs Scott read that it was closed. What did Mrs Scott 
read? 
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(C) Pam saw that her dad picked flowers. Then she found a vase for them. What did Pam 
see? 
 (C) The car was blue, but Mr Smith said that it was red. What did Mr Smith say? 
 (D) Sue heard that her parents were angry. Then she went into her playroom. What did 
Sue hear? 
 (D) Luke noticed that his sister spilt milk. Then he got a cloth for her. What did Luke 
notice? 
(C) Claire met a girl, but she pretended that she met a queen. What did Claire pretend?  
